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Abstract 
In this current study I’m offering a recommendation for the development of a model that 
could provide us with an answer to the following question: which factors influence the 
successful introduction of the reforms related to the New Public Management (NPM) 
movement? The question is relevant, since the East-Central European countries have just 
embarked on transforming their public administrations according to the NPM during the past 
years. 
Keywords: New public management, Hungary 
 
1. Introduction 
At the dawn of the 21st century the Hungarian public is disappointed and pessimistic about 
its future, despite the fact that the country as a member of the European Union and NATO has 
unquestionably become part of the Euro-Atlantic region.2 The operational role of the state that 
Hungarians consider so vital in shaping their lives is perceived as unsuccessful3, because in 
their opinion it does not contribute sufficiently to their welfare. Not only the mood of the 
population, but also international surveys indicate that in Hungary public administration and 
                                                           
1 The preparation of this study was supported by the TÁMOP 4.2.1. B 09/1/KMR-2010.0005 framework-
contract. This chapter is prepared for the volume of the conference series called “Western-Eastern Europe: 
Centre-Periphery Dynamics”. The author thanks Prof. Dr. András Blahó, Prof. Dr. Marie Claude Esposito, Prof. 
Dr. Balázs Hámori, Prof. Dr. Katalin Szabó, Dr. László Tóth and Júlia Koltai for their helpful suggestions and 
comments on the draft of the paper. 
2
 According to the Eurobarometer survey of fall, 2009, 58% of the Hungarian public is dissatisfied with their 
lives, the picture is primarily unfavourable in the case of the 40-54 age group: 7 out of every 10 people are 
dissatisfied with their lives. In regards to their future prospects, 14% of Hungarians are optimistic while the 
decisive majority is pessimistic about their future. (EC 2009:2-5) 
3
 We can learn more about the great magnitude - even in international comparison - of the expectations set 
towards the state in the survey of Tárki, 2007. See: (Medgyesi – Tóth et al. 2007). 
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public services work with low efficiency, with questionable productivity and inequitably for 
the large segments of society (Worldbank 2009); (Tóth 2009). Based on these perceptions it is 
not accidental the in the past twenty years the comprehensive reform of the public sector have 
received a high priority whatever government has been in charge and will be probably the 
case in the future as well.4 
Public sector reforms root even further back in time in the developed Western 
democracies than in Hungary, as it has been continuously on the agenda for the past 30 years. 
Referring to the experiences accumulated in old European Union member states and in Anglo-
Saxon countries is an obvious idea when considering the modernizing efforts of the 
Hungarian State. The reforms concerning the public sector that were realized in the West not 
only mean system-wide, structural changes, but during these reforms emphasize was put on 
the transformation of the management and managing principles of the public sphere. New 
Public Management (NPM) has played a decisive role in that after the millennium and we can 
consider the performance of the Anglo-Saxon public sector as a leading example.5 The NPM 
movement has had a radical effect on the productivity and efficiency of the public sector in 
the United Kingdom, in New Zealand, in the United States and in Australia. (Barzelay 2001) 
As a result of the successes, NPM is almost a mandatory element of the governmental reform 
efforts, so it is not accidental that the adaptation of the NPM techniques and the learning 
process that go with them is financially supported by the European Union in the new member 
states as well. Consequently, even in Hungary significant amounts are at hand for the 
realization of the state reform, to which the governmental, public administration organizations 
can gain access mainly through the tenders run by the State Reform Operational Program.6 
However, the effective introduction of the NPM reforms is not an easy task. The scientific 
community is zealously analyzing the experiences of the developing/less developed countries, 
including Central Eastern European countries. The story they tell are full of failures, and 
ineffective reforms or reforms with negative effects (Lodge – Gill 2011), (Meyer-Sahling 
2009), (Bouckaert et. al. 2009), (Marobela 2008), (Beblavy 2002). According to our 
assumption, NPM is not an everywhere applicable, globally adaptable integrated tool set; it is 
                                                           
4
 In 2009, under the SIGMA program the OECD and the EU published an interesting study about the public 
sector reforms in Central and Eastern Europe. Data concerning Hungary are especially disappointing. (Meyer-
Sahling 2009). 
5
 The NPM movement has received numerous criticisms during the past decades, and as a result of the economic 
crisis reverse processes opposing to the mentality of the movement had taken place in the public sectors of the 
developed countries. We cannot cite unequivocally the New Zealand model anymore either. (Duncan – Chapman 
2010). 
6
 The state reform programs supported by the previous government are categorized by the OECD under the NPM 
movement. See: (Meyer-Sahling 2009:17) 
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rather more similar to an approach and a value system, to which numerous management 
instruments can be fitted. According to our hypothesis the introduction of management 
methods belonging to this approach can only be effective, if these instruments fit the informal 
and formal institutional system followed and applied by the society of the given country. The 
institutional fit is necessary, but not a sufficient condition of the successful introduction of a 
given NPM technique. The talent or inadequacy of the government that is carrying out the 
implementation, and the other external environmental factors that are prevailing in a given 
place and at a given time can fundamentally influence the success of the implementation. In 
the current study we exclusively focus on the institutional factors. The reason behind is on the 
one hand that the institutional fit according to our hypothesis determines which reforms are 
worth being implemented in a given institutional environment. On the other hand, a given 
society’s institutional system shows strong stability in the short- and in the mid-run, so that it 
should be considered as a basic condition, whose knowledge has a fundamental importance 
for decision makers. The objective of our study is to scientifically analyze and answer to the 
following questions: 
− Do informal and formal institutions influence, and if yes, then how and to what extent, the 
opportunities for the successful implementation of the management techniques being 
introduced under the rubric of the NPM movement? 
− What kind of institutional framework, in other words informal and formal institutional 
constellation, is necessary in a given country for successfully implementing a reform 
belonging to the NPM movement? 
− Can a successfully applied NPM reform from a given institutional environment be 
successfully replicated in another, different institutional environment? 
Besides these questions, the author of the study wishes to answer the following one too, if 
the above described hypothesis is confirmed: 
− Can the reforms belonging to the NPM movement be successfully introduced and 
sustained in the long-run taking into account the cluster of institutions characteristic of 
Hungary?7 
 
                                                           
7
 The notion of the “cluster of institutions” is not used uniformly by the various authors. See: Gottlieb (1953) ties 
the notion to economic systems. Acemoglu – Johnson – Robinson (2002) in their paper primarily associates the 
notion with property rights. In the current study, under the notion of the cluster of institutions we think of the 
informal institutions (norms, traditions, habits, the national culture as understood by Hofstede) embedded in the 
core texture of society and the formal institutions (legal system, as the constitution and laws), which with their 
stability and strong social acceptance provide the efficiency of the social, economic and political process for the 
long run. 
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2. Methodology 
Following the introduction of the hypotheses, the applied model is presented in this 
chapter. The model aims to answer the research questions, and to confirm or to reject the 
above mentioned hypotheses. However, before the presentation of the structure of our model 
in details, we wish to clarify the notion of the “model” in social sciences. 
There are numerous definitions for the word “model” in the literature. (Hofstede 1981:16) 
As we see, the development of a scientific model is one of the decisive phases of the theory 
building process, when we attempt to analyze a social scientific phenomenon that has 
“relatively stable characteristics” (Leontief 1986:4, in: Hy - Wollscheid 2008:788) being 
aware of the number of factors influencing the given phenomenon. We only concentrate on 
those that we consider the most important ones. An important characteristic of scientific 
model building is that it is based on the theories accepted by the scientific community and it 
can be tested empirically. The result of the test is accessible and reproducible by anyone. 
Thus, in this way models contribute to the development of science: by building on the theories 
accepted in the given time period, by either refuting or expanding them, they lead to new 
theories. 
When developing our model we considered the above described principles. Thus we set 
out from the theories of the new institutional school, and we only included in our analysis 
those explanatory variables responsible for the success of the reforms belonging to the NPM 
movement, which we considered as the most important ones. We quantified with the aid of 
proxy variables the given blocks of the model, in other words the informal and formal 
institutions. Following that by running the model with the help of statistical methods we 
tested our hypotheses. 
The starting point of the development of our model was Williamson (2000). In his seminal 
works he defined the possible time intervals of each institutional level, establishes that 
informal institutions in the long-run (102 and 103 years), formal institution in the mid-run (10 
and 102 years) are unchangeable, while the factors linked to the government can be changed 
even in the short-run (1 and 10 years). However, when collecting the data for the model, we 
did not take into account the Williamsonian time intervals assigned to each level. According 
to Williamson’s model in case of informal and formal institutions it would have been enough 
to gather data from only one time period, from the 1980’s. However, we did not follow that, 
because Inglehart – Baker’s [2000] research unequivocally highlighted that the proxy variable 
used by us change even in the shorter-run. At the same time Inglehart – Baker ([2000], p. 49.) 
point out that this does not contradict Williamson’s theory, since the changes in the data of the 
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World Value Survey (WVS) and the European Value Survey (EVS) do not affect the core of 
culture. By assuming the changes of descriptive, independent variables, we do not make a 
mistake at all, at worst we carry out unnecessary work, since we can guarantee that the cause 
(independent variables) in time precede the effect (dependent variable). Data was chosen, 
following the logic of the model, so it always contains information from the preceding years 
of the reforms. Thus, in line with the implementation of the reforms in the case of some 
countries we used data from the 1980s,8 in the case of certain countries we used data from the 
1990s,9 while in the case of the Central and Eastern European countries10 we used data from 
the 2000s. 
                                                           
8
 This group includes the United States, Australia, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Canada and New Zealand. 
9
 Those countries, which carried out the reforms mostly during the 1990s: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Greece, Ireland, Germany, Norway, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and Sweden. 
10
 The following Central and Eastern European countries were included in the analysis: Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Croatia, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia and Romania. 
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Figure 1. 
The Economics of Institutions 
 
Source: Williamson (2000:597) 
 
Based on Figure 1, Williamson’s model is briefly introduced. The first level of the model 
contains those factors, which – according to our hypothesis – decisively influence the 
Level Frequency Purpose 
Embeddedness: 
 
informal institutions, 
customs, traditions, norms 
religion 
L1 
L2 
L3 
L4 
Institutional environment: 
 
formal rules of the game – 
esp. property (polity, 
judiciary, bureaucracy) 
Governance: 
 
play of the game – esp. 
Contract (aligning 
governance structures with 
transactions) 
Resource allocation and 
employment (prices and 
quantities; incentive 
alignment) 
102 to 103 
10 to 102 
1 to 10 
continuous 
Often noncalculative; 
spontaneous […] 
Get the institutional 
environment right. 
1st order economizing 
Get the governance 
structures right. 
2nd order economizing 
Get the marginal conditions 
right. 
3rd order economizing 
L3: transaction cost economics 
L 4: neoclassical economics / agency theory 
L 1: social theory 
L 2: economics of property rights / positive 
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successful implementation of NPM reforms. These factors have often been considered even 
by the new institutional economists as given. According to Williamson (2000:596), these 
include the rules that are followed even unconsciously by the members of society. North 
(1991:97) called this block informal institutions, and he classified social norms, traditions and 
habits under this group. In this block of our model, where we apply the notion of culture in 
Hofstede’s sense, since as Hofstede and Hofstede (2005:36) writes: 
 
“The culture practically consists of the unwritten rules of the social game.” 
 
The second level contains those formal systems of rules that North (1984) calls formal 
institutions, and which include the system of property rights, the constitution and laws. These 
are the formal rules of the game, which obtain their form and become accountable in the 
social space created by informal institutions. 
The strength of the regulating power of formal institutions varies across cultures; in 
certain societies it is stronger, while in others it is weaker. The contribution of the formal 
institutions to the regulation of the social processes (as formal rules of the game) 
fundamentally depends on informal institutions. Concerning these interrelations and 
mechanisms there still exist numerous open questions, however the historical determination of 
these processes is clear. (Greif – Tabellini, 2010), (Greif, 2006) The changing of the formal 
rules of the game is also a slow process, which take place according to Williamson 
(2000:598) primarily through the influence of external factors, so as a result of civil wars, 
economic crises, foreign occupation, collapse of political systems. 
For the third and forth factors, namely the changes in the government and in resource 
allocations, we can bring up examples from our lives as well. These levels usually pertain to 
the current workings of the system within the framework defined by the rules of the game 
established by the first and second levels. While the first two levels regulate what the social 
actors can do, on these levels the emphasis is placed on the question of how. 
The first block of our model includes the notion of national culture as well. According to 
Hofstede and Hofstede (2005:6-9) culture is built up like an onion. In its core, we can find 
those social values that are extremely resistant; they rarely change over time and at a given 
moment they can be considered as unchangeable. Whereas the outer layers of the onion 
consist of the rituals, heroes, symbols – that are jointly called “practices” by Hofstede – 
change more easily and faster during the course of time. When combining Hofstede – 
Hofstede’s (2005) notion of culture and Williamson’s (2000) institutional economics we must 
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keep in mind that the first level that is called by Williamson “embeddedness” basically 
corresponds to the inner core of Hofstede’s cultural onion, namely the values. 
In the next section the model by which we wish to analyze the likelihood of the successful 
implementation of the NPM reforms is introduced. The model is quite simple, with a static 
structure, and it contains all together four explanatory and one outcome blocks. In Figure 2. 
the interaction between the various blocks are not indicated separately in order to simplify the 
introduction of the model, since the main direction of causality according to our hypothesis is 
clearly heading from block 1. through blocks 2., 3, and 4. to the outcome variable. All of this, 
however, does not mean that during the statistical analysis the interactions do not come to 
light, however we find it sufficient to call attention to the main cause and effect interrelation, 
when illustrating the model.11 
During the analysis the data of 31 countries was processed. Beside the 27 countries12 of 
Europe we included in the analysis the United States, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. 
The database of the European countries was complemented with the Anglo-Saxon countries, 
because the NPM reform movement had developed the earliest and transformed the public 
sphere at the most depth and width in these countries. (Barzelay 2001) 
During the description of the model each of its blocks are depicted. Following the 
introduction of the independent variables, the measurements of the success of the NPM 
reforms are reviewed. Capturing the notion of success is key to the working of the model, so 
our recommended technique is described in more details. The operationalization of success is 
necessary when we wish to determine the likelihood of a successful implementation of an 
NPM reform. 
We will not deal in details with all the blocks of our model, since for answering our 
research question it is sufficient to examine and to empirically test only the first two blocks 
and the success of the NPM reforms. The reason behind this is that primarily we are interested 
in the “what” question, in other words under what framework of conditions it is worth to set 
out to implement an NPM reform. According to our hypothesis there will be a strong 
correlation between the first two blocks of the model (informal and formal institutions) and 
the successful implementation of the reforms belonging to the NPM movement. The analysis 
does not cover the examination of all necessary conditions (3. and 4. blocks). Therefore, in the 
                                                           
11
 During the development of the model I was inspired by Kornai’s (1992: 360-379) explanatory theory of the 
workings of socialism and the model related to that. 
12
 The list of the European countries does not match the member countries of the European Union. The countries 
included in the analysis: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, United Kingdom, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Greece, Holland, Croatia, Ireland, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Germany, Norway, Italy, 
Portugal, Romania, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
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case of those countries where by our analyses we can state that their reform attempt was 
futile, we cannot decide whether it was unsuccessful, because the approach and set of 
instruments of the NPM movement did not fit the institutional system of the country, or 
because the decision makers of the given time period did not possess the appropriate 
competence and skills for the successful implementation of an NPM reform or because the 
interrelations between the NPM reforms being introduced impeded the successful reforms.13 
Therefore, based on the current study an answer will be given to the following question: the 
realized forms of the NPM reforms are compatible with the institutional system of which 
countries, and with which they are not. The exact reasons behind the futility of a reform 
belonging to the NPM movement can only be uncovered by the analysis of the third block 
(governmental competences and skills) and the forth block (the interrelations between the 
simultaneously introduced NPM reforms). This analysis includes the examination of the 
political, economic and other social processes at a given time and space, as well as the 
organizational culture of a given country’s public sector. 14 
However, beside the above limitations, based on our analysis even in the case of the 
unsuccessful countries we will be able to decide with a great probability – but unequivocally – 
whether a given country was incapable to implement the reforms belonging to the NPM 
movement, because of its institutional system or other factors, such as the lack of government 
abilities that caused the failure. If a country’s institutional system is the same, or very similar, 
to the ones of the successful countries and yet its attempt to implement the NPM reforms was 
futile, then we can assume that its failure was not caused by the relationship to the 
institutional factors, rather it is explained by other causes, for instance the government’s 
abilities and the organizational culture dominant in the public sector. 
                                                           
13
 However, by the analysis of the first two blocks we can gain information about the third block as well. As 
Pillay (2008:380) states: „ Generally speaking, managers and leaders, as well as the people they work with, are 
part of a national society. In understanding their behaviour, one has to understand the society they live and 
function in.” 
14
 The analysis of the reforms that influence each other in a given time period is to be particularly emphasized. 
During the introduction of the NPM reforms there can be an optimal order, which is to be followed by the 
decision makers in order to achieve success. Besides this, certain NPM instruments formulate conflicting 
expectations and objectives, so their concurrent introduction – because of the conflicting objectives - will lead to 
failure. 
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Figure 2.  
The causality between the factors determining the successful implementation of the NPM 
 
Source: Own figure 
Other influencing factors appearing in the literature: economic pressures, political support, social changes (for instance: growth in the number of skilled 
workers), political changes (weakening powers of the unions, increasing power of the non-elected public officials), changes in the civil sector (weakening of 
the professional interest groups, for instance: teachers, medical doctors, etc.), technological changes, pressures from the international organizations, fashion, 
etc. 
1. block 
Informal institutions 
Informal rules of the game 
(norms, traditions, habits) 
(North 1990) and 
(Williamson 2000) 
Embeddedness 
(Granovetter 1990), 
(Williamson 2000) and (Nee 
2003) 
National values in the 
Hofstedeian sense 
(Hofstede – Hofstede 2005) 
2. block 
Formal Institutions 
Formal rules of the 
game 
(legal and political rules, 
constitution, laws)  
(North 1990) and 
(Williamson 2000) 
3. block 
Governmental competences 
and skills 
The structure and culture of civil 
services and governmental 
administration 
Result-block 
 
The probability of 
the successful 
introduction of the 
NPM technique 
Based on the scientific 
literature 
4. block 
Interaction between 
the simultaneously 
introduced NPM 
reforms 
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2.1 First block, informal institutions15 
Informal institutions are the rules, that are unconsciously accepted and spontaneously 
followed by the individual, and which make social coordination more fluent. They are the 
most efficient coordination instruments of the relationships between the millions of actors 
making up society with various individual interests. Informal institutions change slowly, 
which is one of their main virtues, but this characteristic has drawbacks as well. They provide 
security in the changing world, but they hinder the development of a given society. It is 
difficult to say how informal institutions arise. Fundamentally they are a product of a learning 
process, which stems from the collective processing of past events. Societies experience a 
great deal of internal and external influences during their history. The survival of a given 
group/society depends on the successful answers given to these influences. The repeatedly 
successful solutions become embedded in the subconscious of the members of society and 
they help the successful adaptation of the members of society in the long-run. Embeddedness 
also means that the members of society unconsciously rely on these informal institutions for 
the solution of certain situations. 
Informal institutions, whatever the definition we use, are intertwined with the notion of 
culture.16 According to Hofstede (1984:389): 
 
“Culture can be defined as the collective programming of the mind which 
distinguishes the members of one category of people from those of another.” 
 
Hofstede’s definition allows for a broad interpretation, in any case the “collective 
programming of the mind” highlights certain characteristics of culture. Programming means 
that the system answers automatically to certain effects with a given response. Capturing 
culture through programming makes it clear that informal institutions like traditions, also 
called by North informal constraints, are identical notions to culture, at least from the 
perspective that both culture and informal institutions are efficient coordinating instruments of 
social – including even economic and political – transactions. 
 
                                                           
15
 See the proxy variables of the informal institutions in the appendix, table 1. 
16
 This is also stated by Pejovich (1999:166): “Thus, informal institutions are the part of a community’s heritage 
that we call culture.” 
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2.2  Second block, formal institutions17 
Following Williamson in the second block we wish to capture formal institutions. 
Williamson (2000:598) classifies the following into the second block: public policy decision 
making, legislation and bureaucracy, the constitution, laws and property rights. Williamson 
(2000:598) defines the second block as the following: 
 
“Constrained by the shadow of the past, the design instruments at Level 2 include the 
executive, legislative, judicial, and bureaucratic functions of government as well as the 
distribution of powers across different levels of government (federalism). The definition 
and enforcement of property rights and of contract laws are important features.” 
 
This definition is very important regarding to the selection of the proxy variables! In order 
to capture the second block, it is worth to capture the following with proxy variables: legal 
system, political system – including for instance the electoral system, the relationship and the 
distribution of power between the local government system and the central government. In 
addition to this, we must measure in some way the strength of property rights and contract 
enforcement, when we include this block into our model. 
The further characteristic of formal institutions is that they increase the stability of the 
working of society by extorting the expected conforming behaviour from the members of 
society. This is necessary, because social actors only follow informal institutions with a 
certain probability; the possibility of deviant behaviour always exists. This characteristic 
assumes that formal institutions mainly stem from informal institutions. 
 
2.3 The capturing methods of success 
Following the short introduction of the independent variables, a review of capturing the 
success of the reforms belonging to the NPM movement is presented. All together 31 
democratic market economies are analyzed at the system level, where the analytical units are 
nation-states, which are examined based on their reforms realized in various time intervals 
(1980-1990, 1990-2000, 2000-2010). The time intervals of the analysis are short- and mid-
run, so in the case of New Zealand the realized reforms taking place between 1980 and 1990 
are considered as successful despite the fact that from 2000 onwards more and more criticism 
                                                           
17
 See the proxy variables of the formal institutions in the appendix, table 2. 
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has been expressed as regards to the effectiveness of the reforms. (Duncan – Chapman 2010) 
(Lodge – Gill 2011) Our objective is to provide a comprehensive, holistic analysis of the 
NPM reforms. The results are based on a thorough review of the scientific publications about 
the realized NPM reforms in the given decades; we do not examine certain sectors and certain 
solutions. In doing so, the following procedure was used. Each country’s success in the 
implementation of the NPM reforms in the given decade is classified on a scale of 1 to 10, 
where 10 was the best and 1 was the worst value. Based on the literature review (several 
hundreds of journal articles and books) an expert estimation of the success of the given 
reforms is provided. A judgment on success is made based on the breadth and the depth of the 
reforms. By breadth we mean which sectors of the public sphere and which levels of public 
administration (central government, levels of local governments) were affected by the 
reforms. By depth we mean the institutionalization of the realized reforms (how enduring is 
the influence of the given reform) and their diversity (what kind of NPM instruments were 
used). In the case of each country, at least four independent expert analyses are taken into 
consideration, out of which at least two were written by the expert of the given country. 
During the selection of the studies analyzed, we aimed to develop our conclusions based on 
the evaluation of as many sectors and NPM solutions as possible.18 
We are aware of the fact that decisions based on literature review are not unambiguous, 
since it is conceivable that another researchers could to a certain extent come to different 
conclusions.19 This can even be the result of personal judgment, but it can also be the result of 
that he or she has read other studies. In order to reach a scientifically provable conclusion, 
during the analysis of the statistical model we will examine how robust the measurement 
results of success are. 
 
3. The description of the statistical analysis 
Our model, which was developed with the help of the above described variables, was 
tested through statistical methods and secondary sources. We used SPSS software for the 
statistical running of the model. First, the number of the proxy variables used for capturing 
informal and formal institutions found on the left side of the model was reduced. To achieve 
this, a principal component analysis was carried out. 
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 See the score of the examined countries in the appendix, table 3. 
19
 About the measurement of the effectiveness of the NPM reforms see also: (Hood 1995; Pollitt and Summa 
1997; Barzelay 2001; Ferlie and Steane 2002; Jones and Kettl 2003; Wollmann 2003; Gualmini 2008; Torres 
2004; Van de Walle and Hammerschmid 2011). 
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Figure 3.  
The values of the informal and formal intuitional factors in the case of the 31 countries 
 
 
Source: Own figure 
 
The high values of the principle component of the informal institutions are characteristic 
of such societies, where the people have the following self-image: they are satisfied with their 
lives, which according to their opinion can be influenced by them, and they experience and 
express the joys of life. They trust in each other, they tolerate social differences, and they 
think liberally about the world, the power distance between people is small. They think as 
individuals, in other words individual freedom is important for them, they are willing to take 
risks, and they do not expect the state to create their welfare. They do not support the 
intervention of the state either in the economy or in their lives; rather they are confident in 
themselves, in the market and in free competition. When setting their objectives they rather 
focus on the short-run. Based on this description the countries with high values for the 
principal component developed from the variables of the informal institutions, are tolerant, 
pro-market and pro-competition, individualist societies built on mutual trust with post modern 
value systems (Inglehart 1999), and their objective is to maximize individual happiness. 
The high values of the principle component of formal institutions are characteristic of 
such countries, which have Scandinavian type legal systems, proportional and party list 
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electoral systems and unicameral parliaments with a high proportion of female 
representatives. In addition, in these countries the position of local governments is stabile; 
they have significant resources, which are complemented by significant authority and human 
resources. The Anglo-Saxon legal traditions, the electoral system built on simple majority, or 
the bicameral parliament have a negative correlation with the value of the principle component. 
After the principle component analysis, two versions of our model were developed to test 
the reliability of our results. Both variations are based on the path analysis model, which 
consists of the series of related multivariate linear regressions. The success of the NPM 
reforms is captured through a 10 item success scale based on the literature, which was also 
tested with a 5 item success scale. Before running the model and presenting the results we 
would like to highlight one important condition. We consider the 31 countries included in the 
analysis as the population, in other words we do not consider the countries chosen by us as a 
sample. It follows that the conclusions of this study cannot be applied and generalized to other 
countries. The reason for this is that the subject of our analysis, the NPM movement, is only 
able to exert positive influence in a democratic and pro-market environment, since the roots of 
the movement go back to such economic theories, which cannot be applied in authoritarian 
and anti-market environments. As a result, we consider the countries included in the analysis 
as a population and not a sample, which means that the significance level analysis loses its 
importance. In addition, there is no need for analyses that assess in what magnitude the 
sample fits the characteristics of the population. 
The path analysis models are in reality a series of regression models suitable for testing 
the cause and effect relationship deductively devised by the researcher.20 By developing a 
path analysis model a probable causal direction can be tested. The causality applied in the 
current study is the following: 
 
Figure 4.  
The direction of the causality of the model (exogenous variable: informal institutions) 
 
Source: Own figure 
 
                                                           
20
 The linear multivariate regression analysis is explained in details by numerous books (Ember – Ember 2009), 
so we can set aside the methodological introduction. 
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We know that numerous other factors influence the success of the NPM reforms (see for 
instance the 3. and the 4. blocks of our model); however we will obtain their combined 
influence and not the influence of each factor. Let us assume that regarding to the success of 
the NPM reforms the combined explanatory power of the independent variables included in 
our model is 25%, then the influence of the other variables explains 75%. 
Aside from the causal direction mentioned above, we also analyze that if we assume that 
the formal institutions influence the informal institutions, then what results would we get. 
 
Figure 5.  
The causal direction of the model (exogenous variable: formal institutions) 
 
Source: Own figure 
 
There is a significant theoretical difference between the two directions. In terms of 
methodology the question is: do we consider the informal institutions or the formal 
institutions as the exogenous variable? We could also assume a symmetrical relationship 
between the two factors, so the arrow between them could point into both directions. 
However, we will not get numerical differences between the two approaches.21 In addition, an 
important characteristic of path analysis models is that all variables included in the model are 
controlled by the previous variables in the model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
21
 This has computational reasons. In this case, when we use one independent and one dependent variable during 
the application of linear regression, then when we estimate the variables, the value of the standardized regression 
coefficient (beta), which is associated with the dependent variable, will not change. It helps the understanding if 
we imagine a coordinate system, in which the linear regression line is located. If we switch the two variables, 
then in reality this means the same as switching the x and the y axes, whereby the character of the line remains 
the same. Further explanation is that in the case of the bivariate regression (in the case of one dependent and one 
independent variable) the value of the regression beta is equal to the value of the correlation between the two 
variables. However, correlation is a symmetrical metrics. 
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Figure 6.  
The path analysis model of the institutional determinants of NPM  
(10 item success scale) 
 
Source: Own figure 
 
Figure 7.  
The path analysis model of the institutional determinants of NPM 
(5 item success scale) 
 
Source: Own figure 
 
After running the path analysis models we can state that we found a strong correlation 
between the success of the NPM reforms captured by the literature and the informal and 
formal institutions. The results of the statistical analysis of our model highlight that there is a 
strong and clear relationship between the success of the NPM reforms and informal 
institutions, while the effects of formal institutions are significantly more modest. 
 
 
 
Informal 
institutions 
Formal 
institutions 
The success of NPM 
reforms based on the 
scientific literature 
5 item success scale 
β1 = -0,10 γ = 0,11 
γ
 2 = 0,87 
Informal 
institutions 
 
Formal 
institutions 
 
The success of NPM 
reforms based on the 
scientific literature 
10 item success scale 
β1 = -0,15 γ = 0,11 
Β2 = 0,9 
20,9% 
27% 
 18
4. Results 
Following the evaluation of the models, now we can provide answers to the research 
questions of the current study. Let us look at our questions and hypotheses! 
 
Do informal and formal institutions influence, and if yes, then how and to what extent, the 
opportunities for the successful implementation of the management techniques being 
introduced under the rubric of the NPM movement? 
Based on our analysis, informal institutions significantly influence the likelihood of the 
successful implementation of the reforms belonging to the NPM movement, and they 
drastically reduce the uncertainty associated with it. We claim that those countries are able to 
successfully implement the management techniques belonging to this reform movement, 
where informal institutions are compatible with the approach of the NPM reforms, in other 
words where social norms support liberal, pro-market and pro-competition values. The NPM 
reforms strongly rely on the private sector, and on the power of the market. As a result, there 
is a need for a well functioning market economy, the essential prerequisite of which is that the 
members of society are confident in themselves, they are entrepreneurial, and they do not 
expect the state to solve their problems. Those values, norms, habits, traditions and national 
culture, which were captured by the positive values of the principal component of informal 
institutions, fit closely to the value system of the NPM reforms. 
Based on the statistical model we claim that the principle component of formal 
institutions, by which the legal and political formal institutions of the countries analyzed were 
described, influences the likelihood of the success of the NPM reforms much more modestly, 
than the principle component capturing the informal part of the cluster of institutions. 
Therefore, a reform belonging to the NPM movement can be successful even if formal 
institutions of the given country do not support this, as long as informal institutions support 
the implementation and realization of the reform. 
 
What kind of institutional framework (informal and formal institutional constellation), is 
necessary in a given country for a successful implementation of a reform belonging to the 
NPM movement? 
The reforms belonging to the NPM movement will most likely be successful, if they are 
introduced in the cluster of institutions that fits the approach of the movement. Thus, the 
likelihood of the successful implementation is larger in such societies, where the members of 
society trust each other and their political institutions, are satisfied with their lives and their 
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financial situation, individualists, confident in themselves and able to tolerate uncertainty and 
diversity, and have postmodern value systems. 
In case of formal institutions, our analysis did not yield such clear results. What we can 
claim with great likelihood is that the individual district electoral system fits better to the 
approach of the NPM reforms than the proportional electoral system, and the Anglo-Saxon 
legal origins fit better the NPM reforms than the Scandinavian legal foundations, however 
even these statements do not mean a really decisive difference. Based on our analysis we can 
claim that formal institutions do not define the success of the NPM reforms, their influence is 
minimal compared to the influence of informal institutions. 
 
Can a successfully applied NPM reform from a given institutional environment be 
successfully replicated in another, different institutional environment? 
Based on our study only a more complex answer can be provided to this research 
question. Since according to our results the influence of informal institutions dominates, an 
NPM reform can be successfully replicated in such an institutional environment, where 
informal institutions are the same, even when formal institutions differ. This is the case for the 
Anglo-Saxon and the Scandinavian countries: regarding to the NPM reforms the relevant 
informal institutional factors are almost the same. It is also important to highlight that the 
informal institutions of these countries are not completely identical, so the NPM reforms are 
realized differently. Imitation, simple copying would not have been successful even in this 
case, as knowledge and experience sharing can only be successful, if they fit to the informal 
institutions of the given country. The more different the informal institutional systems of two 
countries are, the higher the chance of failure is during the adaptation process, and thus the 
NPM reforms to be implemented must be modified. Beyond a certain level of institutional 
dissimilarity, reforms reflecting the values of the NPM movement can be realized only with a 
very small probability. In the case of those countries with cultures significantly differing from 
the values of the NPM movement, other types of reforms can be successful with greater 
probability. These can even lead to similar results as the NPM reforms. This question 
however demands further research. Based on the current study we cannot provide a 
scientifically valid answer to the question of what type of reforms could lead to similar results 
in the Central and Eastern European countries. 
 
Can the reforms belonging to the NPM movement be introduced and effectively sustained 
in the long-run taking into account the cluster of institutions characteristic of Hungary? 
 20
Based on the cluster of institutions characteristic of Hungary, we expact that the 
implementation of the reforms belonging to the NPM movement will be unsuccessful and the 
implemented reforms will not be sustainable in the long-run. Hungary can be characterized by 
such informal institutions, which are in conflict with the values of the NPM movement. Based 
on the statistical analysis of the data of the EVS from 1999, the following picture develops 
about the informal institutions of the Hungarian society: the country can be characterized by a 
medium level of trust and the majority of the members of society are dissatisfied with their 
lives. In comparison with other Central and Eastern European countries included in the 
analysis, Hungarians have the least confidence in the markets, and they support the 
bureaucratic coordination most strongly. This is understandable in light of the fact that the 
majority of the Hungarians feel that they do not control their lives, which are strongly 
influenced by external factors. Based on the analysis Hungarians are highly intolerant, are 
rather uncertainty avoiders, and they can be characterized by strongly conservative attitudes. 
Their relationships are also characterized by high power distance. 
Based on this we can claim that the approach of the NPM movement is alien to the 
traditions of the Hungarian society, and differs significantly from the norms and traditions 
accepted by the members of society. Because of their social norms and culture, it is likely that 
the Hungarian public administration will not be able to accept the reform concepts suggested 
by the NPM movement, which will fall through either during their implementation or during 
their operations phase. It is conceivable that instruments belonging to certain NPM 
movements will survive in the longer run, but they will be distorted and they will adjust to the 
informal institutions of Hungary, and cannot be characterized by the values of the NPM. 
Based on the literature we can claim that in such cases these instruments do more harm than 
good for the public sector of the given country. During the reform of the Hungarian public 
sector the toolkit of the NPM movement should not be applied or imitated entirely, it should 
be adopted to the Hungarian institutional environment, which could demand such levels of 
changes that the modified instruments could not be considered as part of the NPM movement 
anymore. Out of the practices of the more developed countries, it worth to examine the public 
sector reforms of the Southern European countries, since the informal institutions of these 
countries stand the closest to ours, however we have to find our own way. 
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5. Main findings and summary 
The most important yield of the study is that it proved through statistical analyses that 
informal institutions, in other words norms, traditions, habits, beliefs and social culture play 
a decisive role in deciding whether the reforms related to the new public management 
movement can be successfully introduced in a given country or not. If the informal institutions 
of a country differ from the approach of the NPM movement, then the low probability of the 
successful implementation should prompt professional practitioners to fit the reforms to be 
introduced to the informal institutional facilities of the country. The practical relevance of this 
statement is significant: it can even influence the aid policy of the European Union. If the 
culture or traditions of a new member state differ from the cultures of the leading countries of 
the EU, then the European Union takes up a huge risk, if it encourages / forces the new 
member states to implement such reforms that do not fit the informal institutions of the given 
countries. In recent years the European Union has spent significant amounts of money to 
support of the reforms in the new member states, a decisive part of which can be linked to the 
NPM movement. Based on the current study we can claim that these reforms will be 
unsuccessful with high probability, if during their implementation they do not sufficiently 
take into consideration the informal institutional environment of the given country. In most 
cases the result is squandered billions, or the development of non-sustainable systems, or even 
worse, distorted reforms causing effects contrary to the objectives. At the beginning of this 
paper we alluded to some case studies, which analyzed the introduction of the NPM in Africa 
and Asia. They pointed out the seriously negative effects of the reforms belonging to the 
NPM movement. These cases are “trivial” in the sense that in the instances of non-democratic 
systems the toolkit of the NPM movement works in a dysfunctional manner. Based on the 
current study we can claim that even under democratic and market economic conditions the 
success of the NPM reforms cannot be guaranteed. 
Based on the results of the study we can claim that the possible introduction of the NPM 
reforms depends decisively on the informal institutions of a society and to a smaller extent on 
its formal institutions, while the magnitude of the success of the already implemented reforms 
is also determined by the culture of the public administration, and other factors not examined 
(3. and 4. blocks of our model) in the study. 
We consider the modelling and the description of the differences between the influences of 
formal and informal institutions on the NPM reforms as an important result. During our 
analysis it emerged that the possibility of the implementation of the NPM reforms depends on 
informal institutions, which change slowly and which are givens for politicians and for 
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business people at a given point in time. The NPM movement during the past thirty years can 
be characterized as a wave of fashion, which was followed by politicians in order to maximize 
votes. Let us assume that a politician, say that the country’s Minister of Economy, intuitively 
realizes that the reforms belonging to the NPM movement and demanded by the member of 
society, or by a part of it (for instance the scientific elite), or even by an external organization 
(EU, IMF, etc.) do not fit the country’s culture. In this case, he or she keeps public interests in 
mind, if he or she does not embark on such a reform that is doomed to failure with high 
probability, so instead he or she handles the pressure laid on him or her rhetorically. Let us 
not forget that explaining why he or she does not support the implementation of a reform, 
which is successful in another country, is a quite difficult and dangerous political task. 
According to Pollitt, the NPM movement is in a great part the series of such kind of “verbal 
reforms” (Pollitt 2007:14), which he calls discursive convergence. This could seem as an act 
of compensation, but based on the results of our research it is conceivable that in the decisive 
majority of the cases politicians act correctly, when they do not introduce a given NPM 
reform. Based on our results, the discursive convergence can be interpreted as a rational and 
effective defence mechanism. 
Our model also points out that those cultural attributes, which are labelled by Inglehart 
(1999) as postmodern, could play a dominant role in the success of the NPM reforms. This is 
by all means thought-provoking, when we decide on whether to recommend or not the 
implementation of the reforms related to the NPM movement in the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe, where the societies of these countries cannot be characterized by postmodern 
attributes yet. By reviewing the results of the study, we can claim that between the informal 
institutions of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the countries successfully 
implementing NPM reforms there exists such a huge gap that most likely these countries will 
not be able to adapt, in other words to tailor the NPM reforms to their own institutional 
environments. The examples that have been achieved so far also attest this, let us think of the 
Slovakian and Czech practices (Nemec, J. –Merickova, B. – Ochrana, F. 2008), (Nemec 
2010), or even the introduction and realization of the Hungarian TÉR system. Based on our 
study, the reasons behind the failures should be found between the differences in the approach 
and value system necessary to the success of the NPM reforms and the informal institutional 
systems of the Central and Eastern European countries.  
Our study pointed out that the role played by formal institutions in the successful 
implementation of the NPM reforms is rather small. This is proved by the fact that the values 
of the principle components of informal institutions are the highest in the case of the 
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Scandinavian countries, yet these countries were able to adapt the reforms of the NPM 
movement successfully. The root of the difference between the Anglo-Saxon and the 
Scandinavian reforms is worth to be analyzed further, since according to our assumption, the 
differences between the informal institutions stand behind this as well (think of the 
description in the case of 1. model version). 
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7. Appendix 
 
Table 1. 
The proxy-variables of informal institutions 
(Bold: proxies after the principal component analysis) 
The name of proxy-variables Source 
Trust World Value Survey / European Value Survey 
Questions: 
A165.- Most people can be trusted 
E085.- Confidence: Justice System 
E076.- Confidence: The Civil Services 
E075.- Confidence: Parliament 
Optimism – pessimism / Feeling of Happiness World Value Survey / European Value Survey 
Questions: 
A008.- Feeling of happiness 
A170.- Satisfaction with your life 
C006.- Satisfaction with financial situation of 
household 
C033.- Job satisfaction 
Fairness World Value Survey / European Value Survey 
Tolerance World Value Survey / European Value Survey 
Questions: 
A035.- Important child qualities: tolerance and 
respect for other people 
A125.- Neighbours: People of a different race 
A129.- Neighbours: Immigrants/foreign workers 
F118.- Justifiable: homosexuality 
F120.- Justifiable: abortion 
Role of the state World Value Survey / European Value Survey 
Opinion about market coordination and bureaucratic 
coordination 
World Value Survey / European Value Survey 
Questions: 
E036.- Private vs state ownership of business 
E039.- Competition good or harmful 
C060.- How business and industry should be 
managed 
Obedience World Value Survey / European Value Survey 
Responsibility taking or obviating World Value Survey / European Value Survey 
External / internal factors are decisive in life World Value Survey / European Value Survey 
Questions: 
A173.- How much freedom of choice and control 
C034.- Freedom decision taking in job 
Individualism / Collectivism World Value Survey / European Value Survey 
Risk taking or risk avoidance World Value Survey / European Value Survey 
Working culture World Value Survey / European Value Survey 
Political ideology (left – right) World Value Survey / European Value Survey 
Liberal / Conservative thinking World Value Survey / European Value Survey 
Questions: 
D018.- Child needs a home with father and 
mother  
D019.- A woman has to have children to be 
fulfilled  
D022.- Marriage is an out-dated institution 
F126.- Justifiable: taking soft drugs 
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Religiousness World Value Survey / European Value Survey 
Breach of norms and rules World Value Survey / European Value Survey 
Nationalism World Value Survey / European Value Survey 
Power distance index (Hofstede – Hofstede [2008]) and 
http://www.geerthofstede.nl/research--
vsm/dimension-data-matrix.aspx 
Individualism index (Hofstede – Hofstede [2008]) and 
http://www.geerthofstede.nl/research--
vsm/dimension-data-matrix.aspx 
Masculinity index (Hofstede – Hofstede [2008]) and 
http://www.geerthofstede.nl/research--
vsm/dimension-data-matrix.aspx 
Uncertainty avoidance index (Hofstede – Hofstede [2008]) and 
http://www.geerthofstede.nl/research--
vsm/dimension-data-matrix.aspx 
Long-term orientation index (Hofstede – Hofstede [2008]) and 
http://www.geerthofstede.nl/research--
vsm/dimension-data-matrix.aspx 
Indulgence vs. restraint index (Hofstede – Hofstede [2008]) and 
http://www.geerthofstede.nl/research--
vsm/dimension-data-matrix.aspx 
Language family  
Source: Own compilation 
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Table 2. 
The proxy-variables of formal institutions 
(Bold: proxies after the principal component analysis) 
The name of proxy-variables 
Magnitude of state 
centralization 
Economic Freedom of the World – Fraser Institute 
General government consumption spending as a percentage of total 
consumption 
Transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP 
Government enterprises and investment 
Rule of Law 
Economic Freedom of the World – Fraser Institute 
Judicial independence 
Impartial courts 
Protection of property rights 
Integrity of the legal system 
Legal enforcement of contracts 
Magnitude of state 
control 
Economic Freedom of the World – Fraser Institute 
Hiring and firing regulations 
Centralized collective bargaining 
Price controls 
Legal tradition 
Anglo-Saxon legal origin 
German legal origin 
French legal origin 
Scandinavian legal origin 
Type of government 
Minority government 
Coalition government 
Great-coalition government 
One-party ruled government 
Ideology of the 
government 
Conservative 
Liberal 
Social-democrat 
Electoral system 
Single 
member 
district 
First-past-the-post voting 
Multiple rounds (sequential vote) 
Party-proportional representation 
Combination 
Chambers of 
parliament 
Unicameral 
Bicameral 
Referendums 
Local and national wide 
Local 
National 
None 
The participation rate at the first election of the given decade 
Percentage of women in the Parliament in the given decade 
Competencies and responsibilities of local governments 
Local governmental revenues / GDP or state revenues 
Local government employment share as percentage of total governmental employment 
Source: Own compilation 
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Table 3. 
Scores, measuring the success of the implemented NPM reforms in each analysed country, 
based on literature review (10 – highest, 1 – lowest points) 
The name of the country Score 
Scores of NPM reforms implemented between 1980-
1990 by countries 
Australia 9 
United Kingdom 10 
The Netherlands 8 
Canada 8 
New-Zealand 10 
USA 9 
Scores of NPM reforms implemented between 1990-
2000 by countries 
Austria 6 
Belgium 4 
Denmark 7 
Finland 7 
France 5 
Greece 4 
Ireland 7 
Germany 6 
Norway 7 
Italy 4 
Portugal 4 
Spain 4 
Switzerland 8 
Sweden 8 
Scores of NPM reforms implemented between 2000-
2010 by countries 
Bulgaria 3 
Czech Republic 3 
Estonia 5 
Croatia 2 
Poland 3 
Latvia 4 
Lithuania 4 
Hungary 4 
Romania 2 
Slovakia 5 
Slovenia 2 
Source: Own figure 
